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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
JOHN BEASLEY, DANIEL CLAY, TED * 
-~ FELDMAN, HENRY R. HILLENMEYER, * 
RAGWEED CORPORATION, a * 
Louisiana Corporation, TOM R. * 
STEELE, ANNE H. ZELLE, ROBERT * 
K. ZELLE, individually and as Trustee * 
For ROBERT K. ZELLE TRUST, and * 
JEFF A. PERIN, for himself and on * 
Behalf of all similarly situated former * 
Salaried employees of Cooker * 
Restaurant Corporation, * 
* 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
JERRY D. WETHINGTON, RIVER * 
CAPITALPARTNERS IV, L.P., * 
RIVER CAPITAL INVESTORS IV, L.P., * 
RIVER GENERAL PARTNERS IV, LLC, * 
and WAYNE N. BRADLEY, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
FILED IN OFFICE 
DEC 11 Z006 
Deputy Clerk Superior Court 
Fulton County, Georgia 
Civil Action File No. 2005-CV-105368 
(Business Case Division 1-ADB) 
ORDER 
This case is before the Court on the Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings of 
Defendants. Having reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the briefs submitted by 
counsel, the Court finds as follows: 
When deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-
12(c), the issue before the Court is "whether the undisputed facts appearing from the 
pleadings entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law." Harper v. Patterson, 270 Ga. ( 
App. 437, 439, 606 S.E.2d 887, 891 (2004). The pleadings are reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. 
In Georgia the lex loci delictis choice of law doctrine applies. IBM Corp. v. Kemp . 
. J 244 Ga. App. 638, 640, 536 S.E.2d 303, 306 (2000). "Under the rule of lex loci delictis, tort 
o cases are generally governed by the substantive law of the place where the tort or wrong 
occurred." lQ. For torts, the wrong occurs wherever the injury is sustained. lQ. at 641, 536 
S.E.2d at 306. Contracts, however, are governed by the laws of the state in which they 
were made. lQ. at 641, 536 S.E.2d at 307. Additionally, with internal corporate affairs, 
such as disputes among shareholders, the local laws of the state of incorporation govern 
such disputes. Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Assoc., Architects and Planners. Inc., 254 Ga. 
App. 734, 736, 334 S.E.2d 308, 310 (1985). Accordingly, the Court and the parties are in 
agreement that Counts One, Four, Five, Six, and Seven are governed by Ohio law and 
Counts Two, Three, Eight, Nine, Ten, and Eleven are governed by the laws of Tennessee. 
Judgment on the pleadings for Count One of the complaint, breach of contract, is 
hereby GRANTED for River Capital Partners, IV, L.P., River Capital Investors IV, L.P., and 
(J River General Partners IV, LLC (hereinafter "River Capital Defendants"). Closing the 
operations of Cooker Restaurant Corporation (hereinafter "Cooker") without a shareholder 
vote was not in violation of the terms of Section 5 of the Shareholder Agreement dated 
October 1, 2002 (hereinafter "Shareholder Agreement") between the River Capital 
Defendants and Plaintiffs. The Shareholder Agreement required the approval of two-thirds 
of the outstanding shares to sell, transfer, lease or otherwise dispose of substantially all of 
the assets of Cooker. The decision to.close the operations of Cooker does not invoke 
shareholder approval rights provided under section 5 of the Shareholder Agreement. 
Judgment on the pleadings for Count Two of the complaint, interference with 
contract, against Defendants Jerry D. Wethington (hereinafter "Wethington") and Wayne N. 
Bradley (hereinafter "Bradley") is hereby GRANTED. The Court concluded above that the 
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o Shareholder Agreement giving rise to this claim was never breached and thus the action 
for interference with such contract cannot not stand. 
Judgment on the pleadings for Count Three, interference with business 
relationships, against Wethington and Bradley is hereby GRANTED. The Plaintiffs have 
failed to allege any business relationship existing between them and the River Capital 
Defendants outside of the Shareholder Agreement. While Tennessee courts recognize the 
tort of intentional interference with business relationships, if such a relationship is governed 
by a contract and such contract has not been breached then there is so basis forthe claim. 
Trau-Med of America, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co. 71 S.W.3d 691, 701 (Tenn. 2002); see a/so 
Strategic Capital Resources, Inc. v. Dylan Tire Indus., LLC, 102 S.w.3d 603, 610 n.2 
(Tenn. ct. App. 2002). 
Judgment on the pleadings for Counts Four, Five, and Six-negligence and breach 
of fiduciary duty by Wethington acting as a director of Cooker and as an agent of River 
Capital Defendants-is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs' claims of negligence and breach of 
fiduciary duty are brought individually and not derivatively on behalf of Cooker. Derivative 
actions are the proper mechanism to remedy harm done to a corporation for the failed duty 
of a board member and are an exception to the general rule that the board of directors 
have the authority to manage and supervise a corporation. Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 
217, 219 (Ohio 1989). A minority shareholder in a close corporation may bring a direct 
action against controlling shareholders who utilize "their majority control of the corporation 
to their own advantage, without providing minority shareholders with an equal opportunity 
to benefit. .... if such actions were taken without a legitimate business purpose. JQ. at 221. 
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o "A court must preliminarily determine if the pleadings state an injury to the plaintiff upon an 
individual claim as distinguished from an injury that indirectly affects shareholders or 
affects them as a whole." Carlson v. Rabkin, 789 N.E.2d 1122, (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). 
Assuming, as Plaintiffs assert, that Cooker qualifies as a close corporation under 
Ohio law and that River Capital Defendants were the controlling shareholders, the Plaintiffs 
fail to state in the Complaint any individual harm suffered as a result of Wethington's 
alleged negligence. Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to state how the decision to cease all Cooker 
operations in the face of a bankruptcy order violation uniquely benefited Defendants to the 
exclusion of Plaintiffs. Specifically with regards to Count Six, alleged solely against 
Wethington, Wethington was not a shareholder of Cooker and thus no direct action against 
Wethington can stand under the minority shareholder exception. Accordingly, Counts 
Four, Five, and Six may not be asserted as direct actions by Plaintiffs. 
Judgment on the pleadings for Count Seven, negligent misrepresentation, against 
Wethington, the River Capital Defendants, and Bradley is hereby GRANTED. Negligent 
misrepresentation involves an affirmative false statement of fact made in the course of 
one's business or profession for the guidance of others where such information is 
reasonably relied upon and was not obtained through the exercise of reasonable care or 
competence. Veterinary Dermatology. Inc. v. Bruner, 2005 WL 2679628, at 6 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2005). The basis of the negligent misrepresentation claim against Bradley rests on 
his advice to Cooker board members that he "did not think the directors' and officers' 
insurance policy would cover any claims brought relating to the unsecured creditors' 
fund ... " (Complaint, ~ 58, emphasis added). Plaintiffs fail to state a false affirmative 
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8 statement upon which to base the claim of negligent misrepresentation against Bradley. 
o 
Similarly, the Complaint fails to allege any false statements of fact made by Wethington or 
the River Capital Defendants upon which to base the claim of negligent misrepresentation. 
Judgment on the pleadings for Count Eight, breach of fiduciary duty, against Bradley 
is hereby GRANTED. In order to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the Plaintiffs 
must allege the existence of a duty, breach of the duty, and resulting injury. Smith v. 
Futris, 2001 WL 432497, at 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Tennessee courts recognize an 
exception to the rule that attorney is generally not liable for negligence to non-clients if (1) 
the attorney was so involved as to be representing multiple parties, (2) the attorney 
charged or intended to charge all the parties involved, and (3) the non-client(s) justifiably 
and foreseeably relied upon the information supplied. lQ. 
Plaintiffs' Cornplaint quotes the board of director meeting minutes where Bradley 
was identified as "counsel to direetor-Wethington, at Director Wethington's request." 
(Complaint, 1[64; see also Complaint 1[1[78,79, and 84). Additionally, there is no indication 
that Bradley charged or intended to charge Cooker or the other directors for the 
representation provided to Wethington'during the course of the board meetings. Finally, 
any representations that Bradley made were to the directors of Cooker, not to Plaintiffs, so 
Plaintiffs have no basis upon which to assert reasonable and foreseeable reliance upon 
any statements made by Bradley. Accordingly, the pleadings are insufficient to establish a 
non-client claim of breach of fiduciary duty on behalf of Bradley. 
Judgment on the pleadings for Counts Nine and Ten, tortuous interference with 
employment contracts, against Bradley, Wethington, and the River Capital Defendants is 
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o hereby GRANTED. Tortious interference requires (1) the existence of a legal contract, (2) 
awareness by the tortfeasor of the contracts, (3)malicious intent to induce a breach of the 
contract, (4) a breached contract proximately caused by the tortfeasor's acts, and (5) injury 
to the plaintiff as a result of such breach. Forrester v Stockstill, 869 S.w .2d 328, 330 
(Tenn.1994). Corporate agents, however, are protected from torts of interference if such 
acts are done on behalf of the corporation and within the scope of the agent's duties rather 
than for strictly personal, malicious motives. Id. at 335. Wethington, acting as a director of 
Cooker and in an effort to preserve the unsecured creditors' funds supported a board 
decision to close the Cooker operations and to terminate Hillenmeyer's employment. As 
such Wethington's actions were within his authority as a corporate director and were 
"substantially motivated by a intent to further the interest of the corporation .... " lQ. Thus 
o Wethington is entitled to immunityfrom liability and so are the River Capital Defendants, on 
whose behalf Wethington was acting as an agent. Similarly, Bradley's involvement with the 
decision was limited to his role as counsel to Director Wethington and is also shielded from 
personal liability. The Defendants must stand as third parties to the employment contracts 
at issue in order for a claim of tortious interference to move forward. The relationships of 
director, shareholders and counsel to the director have a unity of interest with Cooker and 
thus are not third parties to the contracts at issue. 
Judgment on the pleadings for Count Eleven, concert of action, is hereby 
GRANTED. A civil conspiracy is "a combination between two or more persons to 
accomplish by concert an unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a purpose not in itself 
unlawful by unlawful means." Levy v. Franks, 159 S.W.3d 66, 82 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), 
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I 
o citations omitted. Therefore, if the underlying tort fails, then the conspiracy claim must also 
fail. lQ.; Forrester v. Stockstill, 869 S.w.2d 328, 330 (Tenn.1994). As this Court has found 
reason to grant Defendants judgment on the pleadings for all other counts, so too must the 
Court grant judgment on the pleadings for concert of action. 
The Court also finds reason to address previous motions to withdraw made by 
Plaintiffs' counsel Mr. Nebel and Mr. Cook. All outstanding motions to withdraw as counsel 
to Plaintiffs not previously granted by this Court are hereby GRANTED. 
This Order is a Final Order, judgment on the pleadings on all counts of this 
Complaint having been granted to Defendants. This file should be closed. 
So Ordered this <i5 day of December, 2006. 
ALICE o:8C)NER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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o Copies to: 
o 
Richard H. Sinfield, Esq. 
Kimberly L. Myers, Esq. 
Tony G. Powers, Esq. 
Catherine M. Bennett, Esq. 
Rogers & Hardin LLP 
2700 International Tower 
229 Peachtree ST. NE 
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-0601 
Bobby Lee Cook, Esq. 
L. Branch S. Connelly, Esq. 
P.O. Box 370 
Summerville, Georgia 30747 
Dorothy Kirkley, Esq. 
Kirkley and Hawker LLC 
999 Peachtree St. Suite 1640 
Atlanta, Georgia 30309 
G. Thomas Nebel, Esq. 
Executive Place of the Commons 
750 Old Hickory Blvd. 
Brentwood, Tennessee 37027 
D. Ashbrooke Tullis, Esq. 
Plauche Maselli Landry & Parkerson 
201 st. Charles Avenue, Ste, 4240 
New Orleans LA 7107 
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